REGULATION AND EFFICIENCY by FAINSOD, MERLE
REGULATION AND EFFICIENCY
By MERLE FAINSOD
THE literature of public utility regulation is rich in commentary on
valuation theories and other problems focusing on the regulation of
profits; it is surprisingly deficient in discussion of methods by which
regulation can foster efficiency and progressiveness in the management
of regulated enterprises.' This hiatus in the literature reflects the fact
that regulatory agencies have been so preoccupied with problems of profit
limitation that they have devoted relatively little attention to tile task of
improving utility operations.
An explanation of the lack of concern of regulatory agencies with
problems of efficiency and progressiveness in management reades out
in a number of directions. In part, it is explained by inadequate personnel,
meagre appropriations, lack of authority and absence of initiative on
the part of the regulatory agency. In part, it is inherent in the traditional
conception of the regulatory function as one of restraint rather than
guidance. Regulation in its very nature is a cumbersome method of con-
trolling economic activity.2 It superimposes one set of persons acting on
behalf of the public on another set of persons acting on behalf of a
privately-owned industry, and it divides responsibility between them. As
a result, the very difficult problem of the precise line of demarcation
between the authority of private management and the authority of the
government agency is presented. According to standard theory - gener-
ally accepted by the regulatory agencies - the commissions operate nega-
tively rather than affirmatively. They may approve, modify, or veto
policies when the law vests them with the requisite authority, but they
ordinarily abstain from taking the responsibility of determining policy
in the first instance. The initiative for the day-to-day conduct of the
utility's business and the responsibility for efficient organization lie with
private management.3
*Assistant Professor of Government, Harvard University.
1. For some notable exceptions see Whitten, Regulation of Public Sercice Companies
it Great Britain in 1 ANNUAL REPORT N. Y. PUBL SERv. Cotmu. (1913) Appendix F;
IMORGAN, REGULATION AND THE MANAGEMIENT OF PUBLIC UTILITIES (1923); Bussi:vx,
PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION AND THE So-CA.L SLIDING ScA. (1936); Ruggles,
Problems of Public Utility Rate Regulation and Control (1925) 33 J. PoL. Ecox.. 543;
Some Aspects of Public Utility Ma1nagement and Regulation in 53rm Ai:t,,u REoor,
CONNECTICUT SOCIETY OF CIVIL ENGINEERS (1937) 98-111; studies sponsored by the
Federal Coordinator of Transportation 1933-1936.
2. For acute criticism of the regulatory technique, see Cooper, Ncv Horizons in
Public Utility Control (1938) 22 P. U. FORT. 268 ct seq.
3. Occasional judicial pronouncements are cited to support this view. See, e.g., Mr.
Justice McReynolds in' Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm.,
262 U. S. 276 (1923): "It must never be forgotten that while the state may regulate
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But a large share of responsibility for the preoccupation of regulators
with the control of profits must rest with the courts. A utility which is
dissatisfied with the rate schedule imposed by a commission may appeal
to the courts to protect it against confiscation of its property. In the
language of the courts, it is entitled to a "compensatory" return, a "fair"
return on the "fair value" of its property. Since rates cannot be finally
fixed or adjudged valid until the required profits have been determined,
and the required profits cannot be determined without a finding of "fair
value" which the courts will be willing to accept, the effort to discover
a judicially acceptable "value" to serve as the so-called "rate base" has
become a major feature of rate regulation. 4 The resuli has been to im-
merse commissions in the quagmire of valuation. In the effort to translate
confused and contradictory judicial criteria of "fair value" into an ac-
ceptable rate base, they have been compelled to embark on long drawn-out
investigations and elaborate, but necessarily highly speculative, appraisals
of the current cost of reproducing a given piece of utility property. Not
only may the resulting appraisal be unsatisfactory to the utilities and thus
invite litigation, but the rate base fixed by the court may be obsolete as
soon as it is determined. Fluctuations in the price level may make the
figure no longer current, and the process of valuation must be begun
all over again. These ineffective efforts to control profits have diverted
regulatory agencies from the more important task of shaping a scheme
of rate control designed to secure efficient and economical utility serviceY
with a view to enforcing reasonable rates and charges, it is not the owner of the property
of public utility companies and is not clothed with the general power of management inci-
dent to ownership." Infra p. 1197.
4. For a review of cases and some indications of recent changes in the Supreme
Court's attitude, see Hale, The "Fair Value" Merry-Go-Round, x808 to 1938 (1939) 33
ILL. L. REv. 517.
5. In the effort to escape litigated de'ay and expensive appraisals, utility commis-
sions have increasingly turned in recent years to informal negotiation as a technique for
effecting rate adjustments. Other devices, such as short-cut valuation methods and teal-
porary rate orders, have also been tried. The attempt to employ a short-cut valuation
method utilizing corrective price indices met a rebuff in West v. Chesapeake & Potomac
Tel. Co., 295 U. S. 662 (1935). Meanwhile, a number of states, including New York and
Pennsylvania, have enacted temporary rate order statutes, and a temporary rate order of
the Pennsylvania Utility Commission requiring a rate reduction has been upheld by the
Supreme Court as not confiscatory. See Driscoll v. Edison Light & Power Co., 307 U. S.
104 (1939). The temporary rate order enables utility commissions to avoid some of the
more wasteful aspects of rate litigation. Pending a final determination of value, there is
opportunity to substitute "a judgment from experience as against a judgment from specu-
lation" as to the effect of the new rates. Temporary rate order statutes ordinarily pro-
vide a recoupment scheme to protect utilities against possible losses which may be sus-
tained under the temporary rate schedules. See Harbeson, The Supreme Court and Tem-
porary Rate Orders (1939) 15 J. LAND & P. U. EcoN. 287; Comment (1939) 87 U. op
PA. L. REv. 456.
The present Supreme Court has yet to issue a clear-cut repudiation of Smyth v. Ames.
In the Driscoll case the Court upheld the Pennsylvania temporary rate order by a statu-
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The control of profits is, of course, an important aspect of public utility
regulation. But even a successful effort to limit profits will not necessarily
produce low rates, widespread utilization, and efficient service. An effi-
ciently conducted enterprise with high profit margins may charge low
rates and render generally satisfactory service. Conversely, an inefficiently
conducted enterprise with small profit margins may impose high rates
and give poor service. Where operating expenses are inflated, where
there is considerable unutilized capacity, where the economies of large-
scale production and diversity of demand are not exploited, consumers
may find themselves burdened by high rates and inadequate service, even
though the profit margins of the utility company are impressively small.
An effective regulatory policy which will secure efficient, widespread and
economical service for the consuming public thus involves more than the
regulation of profits. It must organize the utility to achieve the economies
of optimum size and scale, eliminating wasteful duplication of facilities
and minimizing unutilized capacity. It must hold operating expenses to
the minimum consistent with efficient performance of the utility function.
It must make adequate allowances for current maintenance and deprecia-
tion while providing safeguards which will prevent depreciation allow-
ances from being capitalized in the rate base and translated into excessive
rates for consumers. It must keep capital costs as low as possible and
supervise the utility's capital structure. It must fix rates at the lowest
point consistent with the legitimate requirements of the utility while
providing a return sufficient to attract investors without encouraging
over or under investment in utility facilities. It must deal with the mar-
keting problem of adjusting the utility's rate structure to bring about
the widest possible utilization of utility services. It must avoid unde-
sirable discrimination in rates by a proper allocation of costs as between
various classes of services and by a close study of the price of substitutes.
The utility rate structure which it devises must be capable of flexible
variation with phases of the business cycle. Finally, regulatory policy
must make deliberate provision for encouraging efficiency and progress-
iveness in management.
tory construction which made it unnecessary to pass on the broader question "of the con-
stitutionality of a temporary rate, based solely on depreciated original cost." To Mr.
Justice Frankdurter, concurring, the Court's opinion appeared "to give new vitality need-
lessly to the mischievous formula for fixing utility rates in Smyth v. Ames." See 397
U. S. 104, 122 (1939). The Court also avoided taking a stand in Pacific Gas & Electric
Co. v. Railroad Comm., 302 U. S. 388 (1938). "In this instant case," said the Chief
Justice, "we cannot say that the Commission in talng historical cost as the rate base
was making a finding without evidence and therefore arbitrary." The Court refuscd to
say whether the rates fixed were confiscatory but, in remanding the case for a finding as
to confiscation, it gave some indication that rates fixed on a historical cost basis might
be upheld as valid.
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If these be accepted as proper objectives of public utility regulation,
are they attainable under the present system of regulation? What are the
barriers to their realization? Are these barriers formidable enough to
make all efforts to patch up or improve the traditional technique of public
utility regulation an adventure in futility? An analysis of these objectives
in terms of the background of regulatory experience may help to provide
the material for an answer to these questions.
It is remarkable how long delayed was recognition of the apparently
elementary rule that wasteful duplication of facilities should be avoided.
Duplication of facilities was the rule in the early stages of development of
all the great public utilities; consolidation was the exception. Competi-
tion was relied upon to protect the interests of consumers. As consolida-
tion took place and monopolies emerged, regulatory agencies were estab-
lished to safeguard consumer interests. But public faith in competition
still persisted and colored regulatory policy. Thus pooling agreements
among railroads were prohibited by the Act of 1887;' the Sherman
Act7 was applied to railroad traffic agreements and proposed consolida-
tions ;8 even the Transportation Act of 1920,' which in important respects
manifested a new spirit, still retained many traces of the old desire to
preserve competition."°
Regulation, in other words, did not exclude competition either imme-
diately or entirely. Regulators were compelled to shoulder the burden-
some heritage of previous unwise construction policies; they were rarely
endowed with any power to effect a present reorganization of the industry
along more efficient lines. Efforts to vest them with such power were
resisted on the ground that they involved drastic encroachments on prop-
erty rights and invaded the traditional domain of managerial freedom.
The record of the Interstate Commerce Commission, one of the strongest
of the regulatory agencies, illustrates the difficulties encountered in this
field. Successful as that agency has been in its negative functions of
checking extortionate rates and eliminating discrimination and similar
abuses, it has failed to secure a more efficient and economical organization
of the railroad industry." Studies have revealed considerable competitive
waste within the industry and suggested that substantial savings might be
6. 24 STAT. 380 (1887), 49 U. S. C. § 5(1) (1934).
7. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. § 1 (1934).
8. See United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U. S. 290 (1897) ; United
States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U. S. 505 (1898) ; Northern Securities Co. v. United
States, 193 U. S. 197 (1904).
9. 41 STAT. 481 (1920), 49 U. S. C. § 5(2) (1934).
10. E.g., "In the division of such railways into such system under such plan, compe-
tition shall be preserved as fully as possible." 41 STAT. 481 (1920), 49 U. S. C. § 5(2)
(1934) (referring to plan for consolidating railroads into limited number of systems).




effected through consolidation, unification of terminals, direct routing,
pooling of operations and facilities, and other "coordination" projects.12
The Transportation Act of 1920 was designed, at least in part, to
facilitate such savings. It was not particularly successful. Carriers failed
to utilize the opportunities presented by the legalization of pooling
agreements, and the Interstate Commerce Commission was powerless to
compel them to do so. Little was accomplished under the provision
which gave the Commission power to require the joint use of terminals.
Consolidation was left largely to the initiative of private management.
Although piece-meal consolidation between railroads required the ap-
proval of the Interstate Commerce Commission, until 1933 consolidations
achieved through the non-carrier holding company device escaped con-
trol. The Interstate Commerce Commission was instructed to prepare
a comprehensive consolidation plan, but since the Commission was vested
with no real authority to force its wishes upon the carriers, its plan was
necessarily a paper plan. Traditional competitive business strategy con-
tinued to determine railroad alignments and realignments. The Inter-
state Commerce Commission was also vested with power to control con-
structions and abandonments, but the requirement of a certificate of
convenience before new construction could be undertaken came too late.
In a period when railroad mileage was on the decline, it resembled locking
the stable door after the horse had been stolen. The Commission was
also given power to compel new construction in order to insure an ade-
quate transportation system, but this provision was so narrowly inter-
preted by the Supreme Court that much of its potential usefulness was
lost.13 Thus, despite the affirmative planning and coordinating powers
which the Transportation Act of 1920 vested in the Interstate Commerce
Commission, relatively little progress was made toward placing the rail-
road industry on a more efficient basis.
The Emergency Railroad Transportation Act of 193314 represented
still another effort to eliminate the wastes of competition. Like its prede-
cessor, this Act relied largely on voluntary coordination among the car-
riers. It set up a Federal Coordinator of Transportation with power to
compel action. This power was ineffectual, however, in the face of
resistance from both railroad labor and management. The valuable studies
initiated by the Coordinator with their indication of significant possi-
bilities for the elimination of waste and the improvement of service bad
12. See EASTMAN, SUMMARY OF THE WORK OF THE FEDRAL CoonpI::ATR o TrLNs-
PORTATION UNDER THE EmERGENCY RAILROAD TRA1NsroRrATO:1 Acr o 1933 (1935) vith
studies there cited; Cunningham, The Federal Coordinator's Contribution to Railrid
Coordination (1937) 15 HARv. Bus. Rzv. 265.
13. See Interstate Commerce Comm. v. Oregon-Washington R. R., 2, U. S. 14
(1933).
14. 48 STAT. 211 (1933), 49 U. S. C. §214 (1934).
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very little immediate effect, and, in June 1936, the office of Coordinator
was permitted to go out of existence.
This experience in the railroad field does not bode well for attainment
of efficient and economical organization through the regulatory devices
which have thus far been employed. Professor Locklin has recently sug-
gested that "if the regulatory system fails because of its inability to cope
with this problem of reorganizing the industry along more efficient lines,
it will not be because regulation has failed in its traditional sphere, but
because management failed to perform its functions properly, with the
result that public authority is asked to assume functions which manage-
menit should perform."' 5 Given the inability or unwillingness of railroad
management voluntarily to undertake to reorganize the industry "along
more efficient lines," is there any escape from the conclusion that, unless
the more drastic alternative of government ownership is to be embraced,
regulatory agencies must be vested with sufficient additional power to
enable them to compel action? Such strengthening of regulatory author-
ity would involve a redefinition of the traditional boundaries of regula-
tion and management, but unless these boundaries are to be regarded
as more sacred than the goal of efficient and economical service for the
consumer, it is difficult to see how such a redefinition is avoidable.
Regulation, after all, always involves some degree of interference with
management. The only serviceable rule is that the degree of interference
be adjusted to the necessities of each case.
Effective regulation must likewise concern itself with the underlying
costs upon which rates and profits depend. It must analyze operating
costs critically, with the purpose of reducing these costs to the lowest
level consistent with efficient, operation. Regulatory agencies have been
slow to recognize the importance of such activity, perhaps because court
decisions and jurisdictional barriers have frequently served to check
activity in this field.
Some judicial sanction for a critical scrutiny of operating expense in
rate cases was provided by the Supreme Court as early as 1892. In
Chicago & Grand Trunk Ry. v. Wellman it said that a court, before
declaring an act fixing maximum railroad rates unconstitutional as con-
fiscatory, should inquire into the utility's operating expense account to
see whether the utility's need for higher rates was caused by excessive
salaries or other inflated expenses.' 6 This invitation to regulatory agencies
to scrutinize operating expenses was acted upon in part. Requirements
for filing operating and accounting reports with commissions became more
rigid and detailed. These reports often yielded interesting data, but they
did not in themselves reveal whether operating expenses were reasonable
and regulatory agencies encountered considerable difficulty in developing
15. Locklin, Fifty Years of Government Regulation (1938) 52 Q. J. EcoN. 679, 687.
16. 143 U. S. 339, 345 (1892).
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criteria of reasonableness. In the electrical field, for example, regulatory
agencies were rarely equipped with facilities to investigate such a basically
important item as distribution costs; it was consequently almost impossible
for them to develop any satisfactory gauge to judge the claims of utilities
with regard to such elements of expense.
With the rapid growth of holding company systems and the develop-
ment of intricate financial and service relationships between the holding
company and its constituent operating companies, the task of controlling
the expenses of operating companies became infinitely more difficult.T
The holding companies themselves were largely immune from regulation.
As the fees which they imposed were treated as part of the operating
expenses of the operating companies, they were reflected in the rate
structure. State commissions, without control over the holding companies
and without access to their records, found it difficult to question the
propriety of these fees, though they were frequently determined without
arm's length bargaining. Nor were the courts particularly helpful. In
the Southwestern Bell Telcphonc Co. case, the effort of the Missouri
commission to reduce certain fees paid under a license contract between
the American Telephone & Telegraph Co. and a subsidiary received a
stinging rebuke from the Supreme Court.
"There is nothing to indicate bad faith. So far as appears, plaintiff
in error's board of directors has exercised a proper discretion about
this matter requiring business judgment. It must never be forgotten
that while the state may regulate with a view to enforcing reasonable
rates and charges, it is not the owner of the property of public utility
companies and is not clothed with the general power of management
incident to ownership ...
"The Commission is not the financial manager of the corporation
and it is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the
directors of the corporation; nor can it ignore items charged by
the utility as operating expenses unless there is an abuse of dis-
cretion in that regard by the corporate officers . . . "iS
This rule was later qualified in Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co.
where the Supreme Court requested the lower tribunal to make a specific
finding as to whether the fees charged to operating companies for services
bore a reasonable relation to the cost to the holding company of furnishing
these services. 9 A commission's right to inquire into payments to affili-
ated companies not themselves subject to its jurisdiction was definitely
17. See FIDEiAL TRADE Co i ssio,,, UrTmrmr CORPORATIO S, SEzz. Doe. No. 92, 70th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1928) §§ 72A, 73A; BONBRIGHT AND MEA-s, ThE HoCLWCG CoMsPAuNY
(1932); Lilienthal, The Rcgidation of Public Utility Holding Companics (1929) 29 COI-
L. REv. 404.
18. Missouri er rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm., 202 U. S.
276, 288-289 (1923).
19. 282 U. S. 133 (1930).
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upheld in Western Distributing Co. v. Public Service Commission of
Kansas. Mr. Justice Roberts ruled that where both parties to the service
transaction constituted in effect a single business enterprise, scrutiny by
the commission of double profits and inter-company charges was prere-
quisite to a satisfactory consideration of the reasonableness of retail
rates.20
These decisions thus open the way to commission inquiries into the
reasonableness of charges imposed by holding companies on operating
affiliates as part of the rate-making process. The Public Utility Holding
Company Act,2 ' moreover, in providing for direct regulation of holding
company transactions in all their ramifications seems to remove the
obstacles to the effective control 6f improper charges through "service"
or other types of contracts between holding companies and their affiliates.
To the extent that the Act is successful in foreclosing use of the holding
company as a device for the financial exploitation of operating companies,
it may force utility managements to concentrate their efforts ol actual
operations, and thus contribute to the more efficient organization of the
electrical industry.
22
Despite these recent improvements in the framework of control, the
problem of regulating the reasonableness of operating expenses still
presents a challenge which regulatory agencies have not adequately met.
The present system of rate regulation, which in effect guarantees the
utility a compensatory return on fair value, offers little temptation to
utility management to keep down the expense account. Until regulatory
agencies make extensive analyses of actual utility operations and develop
yardsticks of reasonable expenditures, operating expenses can not be
subjected to effective control.
Another sine qua non of effective rate regulation is commission control
of expenditures for maintenance and depreciation. Such control is im-
portant not only because these items contribute significantly to a utility's
operating expenses and thus help to determine the level of rates, but also
because depreciation generally affects the rate base and thus is reflected
in the net income which the utility will be permitted to earn.
Depreciation accounting is one of the most elusive and complex
problems in public utility regulation. Confusion about the nature of
depreciation has resulted in wide differences of opinion as to the most
desirable method of its calculation. It is generally accepted that deprecia-
tion is an inevitable part of the cost of doing business, and that a utility
is entitled to "include in its depreciation calculations all the factors which
constitute the normal causes of plant retirement, wear and tear and other
20. 285 U. S. 119 (1932).
21. 49 STAT. 838 (1935), 15 U. S. C. § 79 (Supp. 1938).
22. See Douglas, Scatteration versus Integration of Public Utility Systems (1938)
22 P. U. FORT. 255.
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forms of physical depreciation as well as functional depreciation arising
from obsolescence, inadequacy, or other functional or social factors that
can reasonably be anticipated."12 ' To the professional accountant, how-
ever, "the real purpose [of depreciation accounting] is to account appro-
priately for the fact that capital has expired,"24 not to make provisions
for future expenditures. The functions commonly attributed to deprecia-
tion accounting in many court and commission decisions - the financing
of replacements, the preservation of continuity of service and physical
efficiency, and the maintenance of capital investment- do not belong to
depreciation as an accounting concept.
2
Regulatory agencies seek to control depreciation practices by prescribing
accounting regulations. The Transportation Act of 1920 specifically
authorizes the Interstate Commerce Commission to
"prescribe for carriers subject to this act, the classes of property
for which depreciation charges may properly be included under
operating expenses, and the percentages of depreciation which shall
be charged with respect to each of such classes of property ...
The carriers subject to this chapter shall not charge to operating
expenses any depreciation charges on classes of property other than
those prescribed by the Commission or charge with respect to any
class of property a percentage other than that prescribed therefor
by the Commission... ."20l
The Federal Communications Commission and the Federal Power Com-
mission are endowed with similar powers.
Commission control over depreciation practices is, like other aspects
of rate regulation, subject to judicial review. Supreme Court pronounce-
ments on depreciation are therefore very significant in appraising the
effectiveness of regulatory agencies in this field. While the Court, recog-
nizing the necessity of provisions for depreciation, has indicated that
it is primarily interested in the constitutionality of depreciation provisions
rather than in the details of calculation, its conception of the function
of depreciation accounting has not always been reconcilable with the best
professional opinion in the field. Thus in United Rail-way & Electric
Co. of Baltimore v. Vest, Mr. Justice Sutherland, speaking for the
majority, set forth the view that the proper basis for depreciation calcula-
23. MfASON, PINCIPLSS OF PUBLIC UTILITY DEPRECIATION (1937) 53-54.
24. Id. at 49.
25. "There is a very real problem in connection with the financing of replacements
of retired property with which a public utility commission may well concern itself,
particularly as a means of insuring adequate and continuous ser%ice, but it should b2
considered as quite distinct from, or at least not more than supplementary to, the prAlem
of depreciation." Id. at 50.
26. 41 STAT. 493 (1920), 49 U. S. C. § 20(5) (1934).
27. 48 STAT. 1078 (1934), 47 U. S. C. §220 (1934) (Federal Communications
Comm.) ; 49 STAT. 855 (1935), 16 U. S. C. §825a (Supp. 193S) (Federal Power Comm.).
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tion was present or reproduction cost, so that adequate provision might
be made for the financing of replacements of property. He stated:
"The allowance for annual depreciation made by the Commission
was based upon costs. The court of appeals held that this was
erroneous and that it should have been based upon the present value.
The court's view of the matter was plainly right. One of the items
of expense to be ascertained and deducted is the amount necessary
to restore property worn out or impaired, so as continuously to
maintain it as nearly as practicable at the same level of efficiency for
the public service. The amount set aside periodically for this purpose
is the so-called depreciation allowance. Manifestly, this allowance
cannot be limited by the original cost, because, if values have ad-
• vanced, the allowance is not sufficient to maintain the level of effi-
ciency. The utility is entitled to see that from earnings the value of
the property invested is kept unimpaired, so that at the end of any
given term of years, the original investment remains as it was at the
beginning. . . . This naturally calls for expenditures equal to the
cost of the wornout equipment at the time of replacement; and this,
for all practical purposes, means present value. It is the settled rule
of the court that the rate base is present value, and it would be
wholly illogical to adopt a different rule for depreciation." 28
Mr. Justice Brandeis's dissenting opinion levelled scathing criticism at
this theory. Citing the experience of business men and prevailing pro-
fessional opinion, he pointed out:
"By those accustomed to read the language of accounting a depre-
ciation charge is understood as meaning the appropriate contribution
for that year to the amount required to make good the cost of the
plant which must ultimately be retired . . . . to attempt to make
the depreciation account reflect economic conditions and changes
would entail entry upon new fields of conjecture and prophecy which
would defeat its purposes . . . "2)
The Supreme Court's views with respect to the adjustment of past
errors in depreciation estimates also seem unnecessarily rigid. In Board
of Public Utility Commissioners v. New York Telephone Co.,8" the Court
held that the consumer had no equitable interest in a utility's depreciation
reserve, and that even when such an accumulated reserve was admittedly
excessive, the company could not be forced to reduce its depreciation
allowance and charge rates that would otherwise be confiscatory in order
to offset the excessive past accumulation of depreciation. Mr. Justice
Butler said:
"The just compensation safeguarded to the utility by the four-
teenth amendment is a reasonable return on the value of the property
28. 280 U. S. 234, 253-254 (1930).
29. 280 U. S. 234, 267-268, 270 (1930).
30. 271 U. S. 23 (1926).
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used at the time that it is being used for the public service, and rates
not sufficient to yield that return are confiscatory rates for the future
... . The property or money of the company represented by the
credit balance in the reserve for depreciation cannot be used to make
up the deficiency." 31
The force of this opinion was somewhat mitigated, however, by the
Court's later declaration in Lindleimcr -,. Illinois Bell Telephone Co. 2
that "the questionable amounts annually charged to operating expenses
for depreciation are large enough to destroy any basis for holding that
it has been convincingly shown that the reduction in income through
the rates in suit would produce confiscation." 3
.Mr. Chief justice Hughes also pointed out in this case that excessive
depreciation allowances not only mean high rates for consumers through
increase of operating expenses, but also may be used to inflate the rate
base and thus be reflected in still higher rates for the future. He said:
"If the amounts charged to operating expenses and credited to
the accounting for depreciation reserve are excessive, to that extent
subscribers for the telephone service are required to provide, in effect,
capital contributions, not to make good losses incurred by the utility
in the service rendered and thus to keep its investment unimpaired,
but to secure additional plant and equipment upon which the utility
expects a return."
34
The courts generally require some depreciation deductions in calculating
the "rate base" upon whid utilities will be permitted to earn a return.
But whether the deduction shall be measured by "observed depreciation"
as determined from a physical inspection of the property, or by the size
of the "depreciation reserve" which the company has been permitted to
accumulate, has not yet been conclusively resolved." The two computa-
tions may yield very different results. Consumer interests seem to require
consistent treatment of depreciation from both the operating expense
and the "rate base" standpoint. In the words of the Interstate Commerce
Commission, " . . . The same elements which produce depreciation for
accounting purposes likewise produce depreciation for valuation purposes,
and they cannot properly be observed and taken into account in the one
use and at the same time be overlooked and neglected in the other ... .
Since regulatory agencies have had to govern their treatment of the
problem by prevailing legal standards, as expressed in court decisions,
31. 271 U. S. 23, 31-32 (1926).
32. 292 U. S. 151 (1934).
33. 292 U. S. 151, 175 (1934).
34. 292 U. S. 151, 169 (1934).
35. For excellent summary of conflicting court and commission decisions, see FCC,
TELEPHONE RATE & RESEARcH DEPT., FUNDAMENTAL LEGtL P 0orna's UN: ER',NING TnZ
REGULATION" OF IxTERSTATE TELPHONE RATES (1938) 1-121.
36. Depreciation Charges of Telephone Companies, 177 I. C. C. 351 (1931).
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the results of imposing ill-founded judicial ideas of depreciation upon
utility administration have frequently been detrimental to effective regu-
lation of depreciation, both as an item of operating expense and as a
factor in rate base calculations. The views suggested by the court in
the Lindheimer case and expressed in Mr. Justice Brandeis's dissent in
the West case promise a more realistic attack on the problem. If these
views receive widespread acceptance the way will be open to effective
control of this important item in rate regulation.
Effective regulation requires control of capital costs as well as of
operating expenses and depreciation, for, from the consumer's viewpoint,
there is no essential difference between capital costs and operating ex-
penses.37 Inasmuch as both are part of the cost of doing business, both
must be kept at the minimum consistent with efficient performance if
consumer rates are to be lowered. Efficient operation of a utility ordinarily
requires that earnings be sufficient to cover essential capital costs, main-
tain credit, and enable the company to secure new capital on reasonable
terms.
Regulatory agencies may maintain capital costs at a proper and reason-
able level through supervision of security issues. Those agencies which
possess and have exercised this power over a period of years are par-
ticularly competent to determine earning requirements with reference to
reasonable capital costs. Massachusetts, for example, which has a long
record of strict control over security issues by public utility companies,
"has followed, essentially, the principle of regulating utility rates on the
basis of providing for the annual costs of fixed charge capital, plus a
return on common stock sufficient to meet the demands of the securities
markets . . . The control of rates has been coordinated with the control
of security issuance.""8 In states where there has been no such control
over security issues, the task of relating earning requirements to reason-
able capital costs presents serious problems which have been intensified by
the Supreme Court's method of ascertaining earning requirements. While
the so-called Massachusetts rule - that it is the money honestly and
prudently invested and devoted to the public use that is entitled to earn
37. "In essence, there is no difference between the capital charge and operating ex-
penses, depreciation and taxes. Each is a part of the current cost of supplying the ser-
vices; and each should be met from current income. When the capital charges are for
interest on the floating debt paid at the current rate, this is readily seen. But it is no less
true of a legal obligation to pay interest on long term bonds, entered into years before
the rate hearing and to continue for years thereafter, and it is true also of the economic
obligation to pay dividends in stock, preferred or common. . . . Where the financing has
been proper, the cost to the utility of the capital, required to construct, equip, and operate
its plant, should measure the rate of return which the constitution guarantees opportunity
to earn." Mr. Justice Brandeis concurring in Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel.
Co. v. Public Serv. Comm., 262 U. S. 276, 306 (1923).
38. FCC, TELEPHONE RATE & RESEARC DEPT., THE PRonLEt O THE RATH OF RE-
TURN IN PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION (1938) 5.
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a fair return -has received approval in minority opinions of the court,. 9
the majority, until recently, has tended to give much more weight to
reproduction cost as the base for computing the utility's earning require-
ments.4" The result has been to focus commission energies on valuation
at the cost of other aspects of regulation.
Particularly neglected was the possibility of relating earning require-
ments to reasonable capital costs through adjustments in the "rate of
return."'" Under the "fair return on fair value" formula, it is obvious
that the relationship between "fair return" and "fair value" is that of
multiplier and multiplicand. Practically, a slight variation in the rate of
return may be equivalent to a very considerable variation in the "rate
base." Thus, for example, an increase in the rate *-f return from 6 to 8
per cent would equal a 33 ' per cent incrcase in the rate base. Variations
in the rate of return clearly offer considkrable fIpportunity for manipulat-
ing the total return allowed to the utility.
The process of adjusting" the rate of return has ken hindered by vague
and inconclusive Supreme Court punoi&uncements such as that in the
W1est case:V
"What will constitute a fair return in a given case is nut capable
of exact mathematical demonstration. It is a matter more or less
of approximation about which conclusions may differ. The Court
in the discharge of its constitutional duty on the issue of confiscation
must determine the amount to the best of its ability in the exercise
of a fair, enlightened, and 'independent' judgment as to both law
and facts."
43
The Court has on occasion developed somewhat the constituents of a
"fair, enlightened, and 'indepundent' judgment." It has stated that a
utility is entitled to charge such rates as will iermit it to earn as much
on its investment as is being generally realized by nearby non-speculative
private businesses. It has conceded that the proper rate might vary with
changes in investment opportunities, the money market or general business
conditions. 4 But this is as far as the courts have guided the process of
rate making. Aside from a very few cases in which attempts have been
made to base rates upon studies of capital costs or examination of cor-
39. See note 37 sutfra.
40. For discussions of valuation proldkm kx BAtLL AwNP GtV, PM LeC UTILHV"
VALVATION FOR PUvRrtSE$ Or RATE Cf)NTL (134L ; I ,iRIGimT, TlV.-LLUATiw. o
PRoPRTY" (1937).
41. See FCC, TELPTHO:,E RTL & RES-.,, - r1 . '11 tn: P,,rL r'1 0.1- re R rATz ,r
RxruR%- IN PUBuc UTILITY RE0)L'; 1310; SmmiI. Tie FAh' RAi' oF Rx ;
Ix PUBLIC UTILITY REGUL ATION (1931).
42. 280 U. S. 234 (1930).
43. 280 U. S. 234. 251 (1930).
44. Bluefield Waterworks & Imnpro~vumnt Co'. v. Public Serv. Conmm., 2t,2 U. S.
679, 692 (1923).
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porate earnings in relation to market prices, the rate of return is usually,
as the F.C.C.'s telephone research department has pointed out,4a an
arbitrary figure plucked from the air.
The haphazard nature of rate-of-return determinations reflects the
absence of basic information on the matter of capital costs. A prere-
quisite to satisfactory provision for reasonable capital costs through
adjustments in the rate of return would be *a systematic collection of
accurate data bearing on such matters as the financial history of the
company, the historical costs of debt and capital stock where available,
the current market yields on the company's securities, studies of capital
costs of other companies with similar risk characteristics, the effect on
investors' demand of the special circumstances surrounding the operation
of the particular industry, etc. It is difficult to see how the choice of a
"rate of return" without such data can be more than an arm-chair guess.
Availability of this data would, moreover, facilitate direct control of
the regulated utility's capital structure through more intelligent appraisal
of new security issues. A commission fortified with knowledge of the
financial markets and the demands of investors in general as well as
of the financial needs of the particular utility would be equipped to play
a much more positive role in supervising a utility's capital structure.
It might help to stimulate the transfer of high-cost into low-cost capital;
45. FCC, TELEPHONE RATE & RESEARCH DEPT., THE PROBLEM OF THE RATE OF
RETURN IN PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION (1938) 2-3. The Commission has listed "ten
judicially recognized principles surrounding the problem of return" which are summarized
as follows (FCC, TELEPHONE RATE & RESEARCH DEPT., FACTORS UN-DERLYING ThE "RATF
OF RETURN" IN PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION (1938) vi-vii):
1. A proper rate of return (percentage) or return (compensation) is a
flexible concept and not a static rule.
2. Fixing the proper return necessitates the exercise of "enlightened
judgment" in each case.
3. Current conditions are controlling, and general conditions affecting
all business should be considered.
4. The return should be sufficient to assure confidence in the financial
soundness of the utility, maintain its credit and attract the required capital.
5. The propriety of the allowed return depends largely upon the circum-
stances, locality and risk of the utility enterprise.
6. The return should be equal to that generally being made at the same
time and in the same general region on investments in other enterprises
which have corresponding risks.
7. The historical cost of money to the utility, and the current cost of
money should be considered.
8. A utility's corporate structure, financial history and past operations
should be considered.
9. The return should accomplish, among other things, due recognition of
efficiency or lack of efficiency in management.
10. The future prospects of the utility, its taxes and development, the
potential stimulation from reduced rates and the character of the service
should be considered.
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by developing a program of credit strengthening over a period of years
-possibly implemented by a system of equalization reserves designed to
iron out fluctuations in income- it could both provide investors with
greater security and reduce the costs of securing capital to consumers.
Control of costs or expense, however, is but one side of the problem
of utility regulation. The other side is the control of revenue, the problem
of pricing public utility services. Regulatory agencies ordinarily try to
fix rates at a level which will meet the utility's reasonable expenses and
the legal requirement of a fair return on fair value. This objective is,
of course, predicated on the assumption that the rate structure of the
utility can be adjusted to yield the revenues necessayy to cover these
requirements. This assumption may be justified where the utility is
serving an expanding market; it may be quite unjustified where the
utility operates in a static, declining, or highly competitive market, or
where it is exposed to marked cyclical fluctuations in revenue.
Granted that a utility's revenue requirements can be met, the question
remains how best to adjust the rate structure to meet them. For, at any
given time, a utility's necessary revenue requirements may be secured at
varying rate levels and with different combinations of class rates. Which
should be chosen? What considerations govern the utility in pricing its
services? What considerations govern or ought to govern the regulatory
agency in shaping utility pricing policies?
Rate regulation, to be effective, must take the economic behavior of
the utility under consideration as its point of departure. In the electrical
industry, for example, utilities ordinarily operate at decreasing cost. As
Professor de Chazeau has pointed out: "When the utility operates at
decreasing cost and demand is elastic with a fall in price [often char-
acteristic in electrical utilities], cost may be price determined, and an
increase in required net revenue may be most efficiently attained by a
reduction in the level of rates."4 The electrical utility is dealing, more-
over, not with one market but with a whole series of markets, each with
its peculiar characteristics. Demand for power in the wholesale indus-
trial market varies greatly with boom and depression; the demands of
domestic consumers are much less affected by cyclical fluctuations. The
competition of substitutes may be very uneven in different segments of
the market. While the industrial consumer dissatisfied with the rates
may almost always install his own power plant, the domestic consumer
ordinarily lacks such bargaining power. The electrical utility anxious
to retain industrial business must sell power at a rate equal to or less
than the cost to the industrial consumer of generating his own power.
But unless the rates set for industrial users cover their full share of the
46. de Chazeau, The "Eaming Base" as a "Rate Base": Reply (1938) 52 Q. J.
EcoN. 355; see de Chazeau, The Nature of the "Rate Base" in the Rcgulation of PuMic
Utilities (1937) 51 Q. J. EcoN. 298.
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common costs attributable to that class of business, domestic consumers
may be burdened with unfairly high rates. The behavior of the segment
of the market composed of domestic consumers dictates its own special
treatment. Demand is ordinarily quite inelastic when the price of power
rises but may demonstrate marked elasticity with a fall in price. Elasticity
of demand, moreover, is not only a function of the price of services;
it also depends on the cost of standard appliances. Where these costs
are reduced and appliances brought within the reach of consumers who
could not previously afford them, the result (as experience in the Tennes-
see Valley has demonstrated) may be a striking expansion of demand
for utility servicq.
Any realistic program of regulation must therefore consider all the
pertinent information which can be obtained on such matters as shifting
price levels, substitute services, market characteristics, and elasticity of
demand. The regulatory agency, no less than the utility, must devote
its attention to marketing problems; it must attempt to predict accurately
the effect of rate changes upon volume of sales and revenue. Although
long run interests of consumers dictate a price policy of lower charges
and higher consumption, regulatory agencies frequently find it difficult
to persuade utility managements to make the transition from a high
price-low utilization policy, to lower prices and fuller utilization. The
reluctance of utility managements to experiment with lower rates is
understandable. A considerable interval may elapse before the stimulating
effect of lower rates is noticeably felt. If the charges imposed by the
commission during this interval turn out to be inadequate, the utility
enjoys no legal right to recover the deficit over a future period.41 The
legal doctrine of "spot" control of rates makes past profits and past
losses irrelevant; the reasonableness of rates is measured by the net
revenue at the time the rate litigation is before the court. Legal barriers
of this character tend to check rate experimentation. But there is indica-
tion in recent decisions that these barriers may not be as rigid as is
commonly supposed. "We are not unmindful," Mr. Justice Cardozo
pointed out in West Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Utility Commission of Ohio,
"of the argument . . . that the effect of lower prices may be to swell
the value of the business, and by thus increasing revenues enhance the
ultimate return."4 While this contention was denied in the West Ohio
Gas case because of lack of evidence of the effect of reducing prices,
the intimation is nonetheless present that a more careful marshalling of
47. "The just compensation safeguarded to the utility by the Fourteenth amendment
is a reasonable return in the value of the property used at the time that it is being used
for the public service, and rates not sufficient to yield that return are confiscatory ....
Past losses cannot be used to enhance the value of the property or to support a claim that
rates for the future are confiscatory ... " Board of Public Utility Comm'rs v. New
York Tel. Co., 271 U. S. 23 (1926).
48. 294 U. S. 79, 82-83 (1935).
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data by the Commission, perhaps a close analysis of analogous market
situations, might have changed the result. Willingness on the part of
the courts to sanction rate experimentation would seem to depend par-
tially upon the ability of commissions to present pertinent information
indicating the likelihood of success for these experiments.
Rate experimentation designed to put a "low rate-full utilization" pro-
gram into effect largely depends on cooperation between commissions
and utilities in the solution of long-range marketing problems. Unless
a utility has some assurance that the prescribed rates will yield the neces-
sary return or that it will not be compelled to suffer a loss of income as
a result of rate readjustments, it will prefer litigation to experimentation.
The regulatory agency seeking voluntary rate reductions must not only
demonstrate the advantages to consumers of the pricing policy which
it advocates; it must also show that the utility itself has little to fear
from such a policy. The agency must provide some assurance that the
long-run earning requirements of the utility will be protected, even though
actual earnings in a given year may fall below a compensatory return.
It must also be willing to readjust rates if, after a sufficient lapse of
time, the new schedules fail to yield the required return. It must, in
short, provide incentive to utility managers to undertake rate experi-
mentation.
Utility price problems are by no means confined to the domestic or
rural market. Electric utilities which serve an industrial market are not
only compelled to meet the competition of substitutes but are increasingly
affected as well by the swings of the business cycle. Unfortunately, regu-
latory agencies have given relatively little attention to the wholesale
industrial market. Inasmuch as industrial rates are determined by "com-
petitive forces," agencies have therefore considered them per se "fair
and reasonable." When it has been found necessary to adjust rates so
as to assure a utility a fair return, those adjustments have generally
been made in the domestic market. Unless, however, a proper proportion
of common costs is allocated to wholesale power consumers, domestic
users may be subjected to unfair burdens and capital investment may
suffer severe maladjustment.
Cyclical considerations further complicate the problem. The sharp
decline in the demand for power caused by business depression exposes
the utility to severe and inevitable losses. Indeed, a decline in the cost
of substitute fuels during a depression may force a utility to reduce its
rates to prevent its industrial customers from installing their own power
plants. A regulatory policy which is calculated to minimize the effect
of the business cycle on utility revenue and to relieve the domestic con-
sumer of the heavy fixed charges of a plant expanded to provide for
boomtime industrial consumption, must increase charges to industrial
consumers during periods- of prosperity to a level as high as competing
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substitutes will permit. There is much to be said for a system of equal-
ization reserves, applied particularly to the wholesale power market, which
would set aside the surplus earnings of a boom period to provide for
the inevitable deficiencies in power revenue during depressions. Unless
the depression drop-off in industrial revenues is anticipated in some such
way, utilities may attempt to compensate for their industrial losses through
increases in domestic rates. Other prices may meanwhile be falling;
purchasing power may have suffered a sharp contraction; consumers with
sharply reduced incomes may clamor for rate reductions. Rate increases
will no doubt be difficult to effect under such circumstances, but even
the maintenance of rates at prosperity levels may burden consumers and
contribute to price maladjustments.
The demand for cyclical adjustments in rates finds some sanction in
judicial admissions that rates reasonable during prosperity may be ex-
cessive during depression or that reasonable depression rates may be
confiscatory in boom periods.49 But cyclical considerations have yet to
receive the attention they deserve.50 The fact that the electrical industry
is still in a phase of secular expansion has to some extent mitigated the
impact of depression on the industry and diverted attention from the
problem. But the industry is by no means immune to cyclical disturbances,
and the importance of framing a policy designed to cope effectively with
cyclical requirements becomes more pressing as the industry nears ma-
turity. The task is a difficult one. The mysteries of business cycles are
yet to be fully revealed, and public utility commissions usually are poorly
equipped to probe either their breadth or depth. Few commission staffs
are capable of dealing continuously with the long term economic and
business problems of the utilities subject to their jurisdiction; they are
even more poorly equipped to cope with the complex interrelationships
between utility price policies and other prices. Certainly, one of the first
steps in any program for the improvement of rate regulation is the estab-
lishment of able rate research bureaus for those commissions which do
not now possess them. Utility regulation can scarcely realize its full
potentialities until commissions are able to make intelligent and con-
tinuous analyses of marketing problems, pricing policies and operating
costs, which will enable them to view the utility problem in a wider
economic perspective.
1
49. See Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm., 131 Ohio St. 539, 598, 3 N. E.
(2d) 475, 500 (1936) ; Illinois Commerce Comm. v. Public Serv. Co., 4 P. U. R. (N.s.)
1, 69 (Il1. 1934); FCC, TELEPHONE RATE & RESEARCH DEPr., FACTORS UNDERLYING THE
"RATE OF RETURN" IN PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION (1938) 8-12.
50. See Lilienthal, Regulation of Public Utilities During the Depression (1933) 46
HARv. L. REV. 745; BERNSTEIN, PUBLIC UTILITY RATE-MAKING AND THE PRICE LEVEL
(1937).
51. See RUGGLES, ASPECTS OF THE ORGANIZATION, FUNCTIONS, AND FINANCING OF
STATE PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSIONS (1937), especially c. VI.
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The conception of the regulatory function which has been presented
here implies a much more active and vigorous role for the regulatory
agency than is commonly envisaged. It visualizes regulation, not in
terms of lodging all policy-making initiative with private management
and concentrating on the limitation of profits after they have accrued,
but as a process in which the regulatory agency shares in the formulation
of policy and assumes affirmative responsibility for promoting efficiency
in the organization of the utility itself. The regulatory task, in such a
view, involves positive efforts to reduce the underlying costs upon which
rates depend. It requires the formulation of atandards of operating
efficiency by which the reasonableness of operating expenses can be ap-
praised and management held accountable for results; it means effective
control of allowances for maintenance and depreciation; it involves regu-
lation of the capital structure of the utility and efforts to reduce the
costs of securing capital without drying up the supply of funds for neces-
sary plant expansion. It also contemplates research into utility rate and
marketing problems and continuous concern with problems of unutilized
capacity, programs of market development, elasticity of demand, prices
of substitute fuels, cyclical movements and other factors which affect
the formulation of utility price policy. The focus, in short, is on the
actual operations of the utility, and on methods of improving those oper-
ations.
Some chahges will perforce be necessary before this approach to the
regutlatory function becomes practicable. The agencies implementing
such a program must have abler staffs and larger financial resources than
most commissions now possess. The scope of their powers will require
broadening; many agencies will be forced to reshape their conceptions
of the regulatory task. And the legal imperatives which still dictate pre-
occupation with the problem of valuation will have to be relaxed.
Such changes may be difficult to achieve. Perhaps they are impossible
of attainment. Unless the possibilities in this direction are fully ex-
plored, however, the outlook for the present system of regulated private
ownership appears gloomy. It must be conceded that the present system
of regulation offers many inducements to utility managements to max-
imize their profits by litigation and few inducements to reduce their costs
through efficient operation. The paradoxical situation which permits an
inefficient plant charging high prices generally to earn as large a return
on its "rate base" as an efficient plant charging low prices offers utilities
little incentive to improve their operating standards. Commissions, to be
sure, have authority at present to penalize inefficiency by excluding im-
proper items from operating expenses, and the Supreme Court and many
commissions have recognized "efficient and economical management" as
a factor in determining the return permitted to a utility.Y2 But relatively
52. "The return should be reasonably sufficient to assure confidence in the financial
soundness of the utility and should be adequate, iinder efficient and economical nangae-
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little effort has been made to develop criteria for judging "the efficiency"
of management. Nor is it altogether clear that schemes which merely
increase the return allowed to stockholders in efficiently operated utilities
necessarily provide the most effective incentives to managerial efficiency.
In large corporations with widespread ownership of stock, such schemes
may "result in nothing more than a windfall to those stockholders who
have taken no part in the conduct of the company's affairs and hence
have done nothing to promote the efficiency for which the reward has
been allowed." '' 5 Ownership, where it is separated from management,
will presumably be led .by the hope of increased rewards to promote the
more efficient exercise of management functions. But there is no assur-
ance that management, which may be primarily responsible for heightened
efficiency, will be directly rewarded. Management must look for its
share of reward to the stockholders whence it may or may not be forth-
coming. It may well be, as Morgan has suggested, that managerial
efficiency can be most effectively promoted through a scheme of direct
awards bestowed by regulatory agencies for exceptional performance,"
Such a scheme would raise the problem of how to measure managerial
efficiency; it would require the elaboration of standards of performance
and determination of the degree to which individual utilities meet these
standards. The task would scarcely be easy, but it at least offers a more
direct attack on the problem of efficiency than is achieved by merely
varying the rates of return to stockholders.
The sliding scale plan is often put forward as an effective technique
for stimulating managerial efficiency. Under the Washington sliding
scale plan, which has attracted attention because of the rate reductions
which have attended its application, a basic or "normal" rate of return
is established on an agreed base." Super-normal earnings of a given
ment, to maintain and support its credit and to enable it to raise the money necessary for
the proper discharge of its public duties." [Italics snpplied]. Mr. Justice Butler in llue-
field Waterworks & Imp. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm., 262 U. S. 679, 693 (1923); cf. Mr.
Justice Brandeis concurring in Missouri e.r rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm. 262 U. S. 276, 291 (1923): "The compensation which the constitution guaran-
tees an opportuity to earn is the reasonable cost of conducting the business. Cost includes
not only operating expenses, but also capital charges. Capital charges cover the allow-
ance, by way of interest, for the use of the capital, whatever the nature of the security
issued therefor; the allowance for risk incurred; and enough more to attract capital. The
reasonable rate to be prescribed by a commission way allow an efficiently managed utility
much more." [Italics supplied]. For summary of court and commission decisions on this
problem see FCC, TELEPHONE RATE & RESEARCH DEPT., FACTORS UNDLItLYING TIE "RATE
OF RETURN" IN PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION (1938) 46-49.
53. FCC, TELEPHONE RATE & RESEARCH DEPT., op. cit. supra note 41, at 17.
54. See MORGAN, REGULATION AND TIlE 'MANAGEmENT OF PtBLiC UTILITIES (1423),
especially c. VII.
55. See BussiNG, PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION AND THE SO-CALLED SLIDING SCALE
(1936) for more elaborate exposition and criticism of the system. The policy of sharing
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year go to stockholders in that year, but rates are subsequently reduced
over a period of years to absorb the super-normal earnings of that year.
If, however, earnings on the rate base fall below the "normal" return,
the commission must increase rates sufficiently to yield the agreed "nor-
mal" return. Under this plan, super-normal profits go to stockholders
rather than to management or employees, and no effort is made to differ-
entiate between increased profits which are due to managerial efficiency
and profits attributable to industrial fluctuations or other factors apart
from management. No penalty is imposed for sub-standard perform-
ance; if managerial inefficiency causes the company to earn less than the
"normal" return, the commission is required to raise rates in order to
increase its income to the required level. The plan gives inadequate
attention to the regulated utility's capital structure; it offers no incentive
to reduce capital costs or debt. Finally, it appears peculiarly inapplicable
to that segment of the utility market -industrial power -which is
especially exposed to cyclical fluctuations. Under the sliding scale plan,
rates on industrial power will be reduced during a boomtime period of
rising utility profits. It is precisely during such periods, however, that
industrial rates should be increased to provide a reserve against the
losses which will be suffered in the industrial market when depression
comes.
Until these deficiencies in the sliding scale plan are remedied by appro-
priate adjustments, the plan must be regarded as seriously inadequate.
But despite its present defects, the plan is to be preferred to the conven-
tional regulatory procedures with their constant and vexatious redeterm-
inations of the rate base and their long drawn-out, costly controversies.
It is unlikely that a search for expedients to improve the regulatory
technique will reveal any single panacea. The sliding scale in its present
form is certainly not the answer. The problems of public utility regula-
tion ramify in as many directions as the problems of public utility oper-
ation- regulators must concern themselves with all of them. This does
not mean that the success of regulation depends upon the transfer of all
managerial initiative from the utilities to the regulatory agencies. It
does mean that the regulatory agency must be sufficiently expert in the
premises to hold management to a standard of reasonable achievement
over the whole range of its activities. It also means that regulatory
agencies have a creative as well as a disciplinary function to perform,
that they must be prepared not only to intervene to cbeck irregularities
and abuses, but also to collaborate with and, if necessary, guide utility
managements in achieving the most efficient utilization of utility resources.
the rewards of efficiency with management and employees is an integral feature of the
British use of the sliding scale technique; it is not, however, employed in the American
version of this regulatory device.
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